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The Effects of Focus and Diversification on
Bank Risk and Return:
Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios
Abstract
We study empirically the effect of focus (specialization) vs. diversification on the return
and the risk of banks using data from 105 Italian banks over the period 1993–1999. Specif-
ically, we analyze the tradeoffs between (loan portfolio) focus and diversification using a
unique data set that is able to identify individual bank loan exposures to different industries,
to different sectors, and to different geographical regions. Our results are consistent with a
theory that predicts a deterioration in bank monitoring quality at high levels of risk and a
deterioration in bank monitoring quality upon lending expansion into newer or competitive
industries. We find that industrial loan diversification reduces bank return while endoge-
nously producing riskier loans for all banks in our sample, this effect being most powerful for
high risk banks. Sectoral loan diversification only produces an inefficient risk–return trade-
off for banks with very high levels of risk. Geographical diversification on the other hand
does result in an improvement in the risk–return tradeoff for banks with low levels of risk.
Overall, our results suggest that diversification of bank assets is not guaranteed to produce
more performance efficient and/or safer banks.
1 Introduction
The issue of choosing between focus and diversification of a firm’s business activities has been
at the center of a large body of literature in corporate finance. Of particular interest has been
the question of whether diversification enhances or destroys the profitability of firms and,
in turn, their value. The broad evidence seems to suggest that diversification does destroy
value leading to what is popularly knows as the “diversification discount.”1 Several theories
have been proposed to explain this phenomenon such as managerial risk-aversion (Baruch
and Lev, 1981), agency problems between managers and shareholders (Denis, Denis and
Sarin, 1997, and Cornett et al., 2001), inefficiency of internal capital markets (Scharfstein
and Stein, 2000), and power-struggles between different segments of a firm (Rajan, Servaes
and Zingales, 2000). Some of these studies have also attempted to link their theories to the
cross-sectional variation in diversification discounts and premia.
Surprisingly however, this issue has not been addressed thoroughly in the context of an
important class of firms: financial institutions (FIs) and banks.2 There are several reasons
why this class is attractive for an investigation of the focus vs. diversification issue. It
appears at first blush that FIs and banks can achieve either focus or diversification a lot
more easily than ordinary firms by investing or disinvesting financial claims (loans) in certain
industries and markets. In contrast, a standard corporation has a somewhat limited choice
in expanding its product range and the transaction costs of adjusting its portfolio of real–
sector activities may well be very high. In addition, financial institutions face several (often
conflicting) regulations that create incentives either to diversify or focus their assets, such as
the imposition of capital requirements that are tied to the risk of assets, branching and asset
investment restrictions, etc. Hence, from both an economic as well as a policy standpoint,
it is interesting to ask if FIs and banks benefit from diversification. In particular, when
does their risk–return tradeoff improve upon diversification of their loan portfolio to more
industries and countries?
Finally, the very nature of an intermediary’s business activity makes the question of focus
1Diversification discount is measured as the difference between the value of a merged or a diversified firm
and the sum of the values of stand-alone firms corresponding to the acquired firms or the merged business
segments. Lang and Stulz (1994) show that diversified firms in U.S. have poorer firm performance (Tobin’s
q) compared to pure–play firms. Comment and Jarrell (1995), and, Berger and Ofek (1995) document that
diversification discount in the U.S. is in the range of 12.7% to 15.2%. Lins and Servaes (1999) provide
evidence for Germany, Japan, and U.K. The issue of there being a discount on average is still under debate.
For example, Campa and Kedia (2000) and Villalonga (2001) model econometrically the endogenous choice
of firms to be focused or diversified and document that average discount is much lower than previously
estimated. It is difficult however to dispute the claim that there is significant cross–sectional variation in
discounts and premia across different firms.
2DeLong (2001) does look at this issue in the context of merger of financial firms in the U.S.
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versus diversification an interesting issue to explore. FIs and banks act as “delegated moni-
tors” in the sense of Diamond (1984). The very act of performing this delegated monitoring
function renders them “special” on the lending side in that they have (at least some form
of) information monopoly over the firms they lend to, as noted by Fama (1980, 1985), and
James (1987), and as modelled by Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990). The downside risk of
borrowing firms translates into the riskiness of the loans held by FIs and banks. The quality
of banks’ and FIs’ delegated monitoring thus directly affects the endogenous quality of their
loans and in turn their default risk. However, due to the equityholder–creditor conflicts dis-
cussed in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) among others, incentives to monitor
are affected by the extent of debt in the FI’s capital structure and the downside risk of the
firms to whom it lends.3 Under such an incentive structure, can FIs and banks monitor
their loans effectively as they expand into new industries and segments of the loan markets?
How does the decision to be focused or diversified affect their monitoring incentives and the
endogenous quality, i.e., the risk and the return, of their loans?
In this paper, we attempt to answer some of these questions empirically by examining
data on the asset and loan portfolio composition of individual Italian banks during the period
1993–1999. The choice of Italian banks is driven by the availability of detailed industrial,
sectoral, and geographical composition of their balance-sheets. By contrast, in the United
States, publicly available data on bank loan portfolios is restricted to call reports which
do not contain such “fine” asset decompositions. The U.S. regulators do not provide the
breakdown of individual (or aggregate) bank lending to specific industries. Instead, the
general level of disaggregation is highly “macro” in nature, e.g., household sector loans,
commercial and industrial loans, etc. We obtain results that are sufficiently strong and
robust to warrant a closer look at the wisdom of simply advocating banks to diversify as
much as possible, and, suggest a more careful assessment needs to be made of the costs and
benefits of diversification.
Some of these issues have been looked at in a recent paper by Winton (1999). Winton
presents a theoretical framework to investigate the merit to FIs and banks of the proverbial
wisdom of not putting all your eggs in one basket.4 Winton’s model provides a number
of testable empirical hypotheses which we use to frame the empirical tests below. These
3For illustration, consider the extreme case where debt hangover is extremely high so that all benefit from
monitoring will accrue only to creditors. In this case, bankowners (equityholders or managers assumed to
be fully aligned with equityholders) have little “incentive to monitor.” In general, the underinvestment in
monitoring will be more severe the greater the debt hangover problem.
4Winton motivates the issue by comparing the following two advices: “Its the part of a wise man to keep
himself today for tomorrow and not venture all his eggs in one basket” by Miguel de Cervantes (Don Quixote
de la Mancha, 1605), and, Behold the fool saith “Put not thine eggs in one basket” - which is but a manner
of saying, “Scatter your money and attention”; but the wise man saith “Put all your eggs in one basket and
watch that basket” by Mark Twain (Pudd’nhead Wilson, 1894).
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hypotheses are central to the focus versus diversification debate. Specifically, we examine
two principal hypotheses:
H.1 The relationship between bank return and diversification is non–linear in bank risk
(inverted U–shaped). To be precise, diversification across loan sectors helps a bank’s return
most when loans have moderate exposure to sector downturns (downside risk); when loans
have low downside risk, diversification has little benefit; when loans have sufficiently high
downside risk, diversification may actually reduce its return.5
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.
From traditional portfolio theory, we know that diversification increases the central ten-
dency of the distribution of loan portfolio. However, as Winton (1999) notes, when debt is
risky and high enough compared to this central tendency, diversification can in fact increase
the probability of default. For sake of illustration, Figure 1 plots the cumulative probability
function for two normal distributions with different standard deviations and with a common
mean of zero. If the level of debt is to the left of zero (under a suitable scale), e.g., at x
= −1, then a decrease in standard deviation reduces the probability of default. However, if
the level of debt is to the right of zero, e.g., at x = 1, then a decrease in standard deviation
actually increases the probability of default. The left skewed nature of a typical loan portfo-
lio’s return distribution implies that the level of debt, in fact, may not need to be too high
for this perverse effect to arise.6
H.2 A bank’s monitoring effectiveness may be lower in newly entered and competitive
sectors, and thus, diversification can result in a poorer quality of loans and increase the
bank’s risk of failure.
There are three reasons why this might arise. First, banks may lack the monitoring
expertise in lending to a new sector when there are learning costs. Second, when the loan
5By portfolio “downside risk,” we mean the likelihood that the portfolio return will be lower than a given
threshold (e.g., level of deposits in the bank’s capital structure), an event that constitutes a “default.” An
alternative measure of downside risk, and one that is employed in the paper due to its greater measurability,
is the expected losses on the loans that constitute the portfolio.
6The additional bite to this hypothesis arises from the interaction of this perverse effect of diversification
on bank risk and the bank’s monitoring incentives. The conflict of interest between bankowners and bank
creditors implies that an increase in the probability of default accentuates the debt hangover problem and
reduces the incentives of bankowners to monitor their loans. If the loan portfolio has higher downside risk,
then an improvement in loan monitoring and, in turn, in loan quality, produces greater benefit to the creditors
than to the bankowners. Since the cost of monitoring is borne by the bankowners, the residual claimants,
their incentives to monitor loans are reduced.
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sector to which banks migrate to is already being supplied to by other banks, the effect of
competition could subject banks to adverse selection and a “winner’s curse” effect.7 This
suggests that diversification could lower returns on bank loans and increase its risk of failure
to a greater degree when the sectors into which the bank expands have greater competition
from its peers.8 Third, diversification can cause a bank to grow in size, subjecting it to the
agency–based scale inefficiencies discussed in the corporate finance literature.9
Broadly speaking, a bank’s credit risk depends on its monitoring incentives and effective-
ness as well as on diversification. Thus, diversification per se is no guarantee of a reduced
risk of failure. By the same token, regulatory requirements to diversify are no assurance of
greater banking system stability.10
Overall, our results provide strong support for these two hypotheses. We measure focus
using the Herfindahl index for a bank’s (i) non-financial and housing loan portfolio (I–HHI),
(ii) overall asset sector portfolio (A–HHI), and (iii) geographical portfolio (G–HHI).11 Thus,
an increase in HHI measures (focus), in what follows, implies a decrease in diversification. We
reject the hypothesis that increased diversification (reduced focus) improves bank returns,
measured either as return on assets, return on equity, stock return (wherever the bank is
publicly traded), and market–adjusted or beta–adjusted stock return. Further, we find that
this relationship between focus and bank return is non–linear in the risk of the bank and is
in fact U–shaped as implied by hypothesis H.1 above. Specifically, industrial diversification
appears to decrease return for all levels of bank risk, the decrease being the least for moderate
risk levels and the greatest for high risk levels. Asset sectoral and geographic diversification
on the other hand increase return at moderate levels of risk, but reduce return at very high
levels of risk. We proxy for bank risk in these estimations using a bank’s doubtful and
non–performing loans to assets ratio.
Next, we test hypothesis H.2 by examining endogenous loan quality (risk) by treating
risk as a dependent variable that is affected by the extent of focus (diversification). Our
empirical results suggest that increased focus in terms of industrial sector or asset sectoral
exposure (high values for I–HHI and A–HHI) improves loan quality (reduces risk), whereas
7Several papers discuss this effect of bank competition on loan quality. Some representative references are
Dell’Arricia, Friedman, and Marquez (1999) and Gehrig (1998) for theory, and Shaffer (1998) for empirics.
8The optimal response of banks to competition may thus be to focus (see, also, Boot and Thakor, 2000).
9See Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000),
and, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002).
10For example, in the U.S., regulations restrict a bank’s lending to any one counterparty to a maximum
of 15% of that bank’s capital.
11The Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared weights corresponding to a bank’s exposure to different
industries, sectors, or geographical areas. A higher value of the index corresponds to greater focus or lower
diversification.
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geographical focus (G–HHI) affects loan quality adversely. Further, we find evidence that
when banks enter as lenders into “newer” industries (as measured by a decrease in industrial
focus, i.e., a time-series reduction in I–HHI), there is a contemporaneous deterioration in
loan quality (increase in risk).12 This deterioration is greater, the greater the competition
for loans that the entering bank faces in the “new” industry. The results thus underscore
the importance of “watching the basket” of loans and the need for banks to specialize in
particular sectors for greater effectiveness in monitoring and risk control.13
Combining these results on bank returns and bank loan quality (risk), we conclude that
increased industrial loan diversification results in an inefficient risk–return tradeoff for the
(Italian) banks in our sample, and sectoral diversification results in an inefficient risk–return
tradeoff for banks with relatively high levels of risk. Geographical diversification on the
other hand does result in an improvement in the risk–return tradeoff for banks with low or
moderate current levels of risk.
These results have important and direct implications for the optimal size and scope
of a “bank”. While traditional banking theory based on a delegated monitor argument
recommends that it is optimal for a bank to be maximally diversified across sectors (see, for
example, Boyd and Prescott, 1986), our results suggest that there seem to be diseconomies
of scope that arise through weak monitoring incentives and a poorer quality of loan portfolio
when a risky bank expands into additional industries and sectors. This complements the
agency theory based analysis of the boundaries of a bank’s activities or its scope as proposed
in Cerasi and Daltung (2000).14 It also suggests that the optimal industrial organization
of a banking sector might be one with several focused banks, an outcome that may also be
attractive from an aggregate risk or a systemic risk standpoint as noted by Acharya (2001)
and Shafffer (1994).
From a normative standpoint, our results sound a cautionary note to the adoption of reg-
ulatory mechanisms that encourage bank–level diversification or attempt to measure credit
portfolio risk through traditional diversification measures, without due regard for the en-
dogenously determined quality of loans. Our results could also help explain the empirically
documented phenomenon of DeLong (2001) who finds that bank mergers which are activity
and geography focusing produce superior economic performance than those that diversify.
12We use the qualifier “newer” for industries in the sense that previous exposures of the bank to these
industries had been lower or non–existent, rather than being newer in the sense of technological changes
produced by the industries.
13We conduct several robustness checks including a simultaneous equations estimation of the return and
risk effects resulting from focus (diversification).
14We believe that the agency theories based on conflicts across firm segments proposed in corporate
finance to explain the poor performance of conglomerates cannot completely explain the perverse effect of
diversification on bank returns and bank loan risk. A bank’s lending to different industries is much more
centralized than is the operation of a typical conglomerate’s different segments.
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Finally, our paper is the first to employ a measure of industrial and sectoral focus or diversi-
fication for bank loan portfolios.15 It is also the first to point out a potentially important and
undocumented economic difference between bank diversification achieved through industrial
or asset sectoral exposures and diversification achieved through geographical expansions.
Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 formalizes the empirical hypotheses, H.1 and H.2,
and presents the results. Section 4 provides a discussion and concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data sources
Data for the industrial, asset, and geographic decompositions of the portfolios of Italian
banks in our study are taken from the regulatory reports submitted by these banks to the
Central Bank of Italy, Banker’s Association of Italy (ABI), and Fondo Interbancario di
Tutela dei Deposita (FITS). The latter is the Italian equivalent of the U.S. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Our sample starts with a base of 105 commercial banks that
reported their asset portfolio and other data during the entire 1993–1999 period. These 105
banks constitute over 80 percent of the total banking assets of Italy.16 In terms of size, 8
of these banks are “very large” (as defined by the Central Bank of Italy), 7 are “large,” 15
are “medium,” and the remaining 75 are “small.” In terms of geographical scope of banking
activities, 8 of these banks are “national,” 18 are “regional,” 14 are “intra–regional,” 10 are
“local,” and the remaining 55 are “provincial.”
For each bank, data is available to calculate the following portfolio decompositions:
1. A disaggregated industrial sector decomposition based on each bank’s top five indus-
trial sector exposures with a sixth exposure comprising of the sum of the remaining
exposures, where the exposures could be to any of the 23 industries among: (1) Agri-
cultural, Forestry, and Fishing products, (2) Energy products, (3) Iron and non–iron
Material and Ore, (4) Ores and products based on non-metallic minerals, (5) Chemicals,
15In the banking literature, Saunders and Wilson (2001), Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon (1996), and
Berger and DeYoung (2001) examine geographical diversification. Caprio and Wilson (1997) examine cross–
country evidence for relationship between on–balance sheet concentration and bank insolvency. Klein and
Saidenberg (1998) present portfolio simulations demonstrating that multi–bank bank holding companies
hold less capital and do more lending, on average, than their pro forma “pure–play” benchmarks. Berger,
Demsetz and Strahan (1999) find that consolidation in financial services industry has been consistent with
greater diversification of risks on average but with little or no cost efficiency improvements.
16A few of the banks in our sample undertook acquisitions of other banks. Our data set however does not
provide any details as to which were these acquiring banks and which banks did they acquire.
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(6) Metal products, apart from machinery and means of conveyance, (7) Agricultural
and Industrial machinery, (8) Office, EDP Machinery, and others, (9) Electric mate-
rial, (10) Transport, (11) Food products, Beverages, and Tobacco-based products, (12)
Textile, Leather, Shoes, and Clothing products, (13) Paper, Publishing, and Print-
ing products, (14) Rubber and Plastic products, (15) Other Industrial products, (16)
Construction, (17) Services trade and similar, (18) Hotel and Public firms products,
(19) Internal Transport services, (20) Sea and Air Transports, (21) Transport related
services, (22) Communication services, and (23) Other Sales related services. Note
that in aggregate these exposures (collectively defined in the data as Non–financial
and Household exposures) constitute the dominant part of each bank’s portfolio.
2. A broad asset sectoral decomposition based on exposures to (1) Sovereigns, (2) Other
governmental authorities, (3) Non–financial corporations, (4) Financial institutions,
(5) Households, and (6) Other counterparties.
3. A geographical decomposition of all credits (other than those to Financial Institutions)
based on exposures to (1) Italy, (2) Other countries of the European Union (EU), and
(3) Other countries (rest of the world).
These details on portfolio allocation and loan distribution in different industries and geo-
graphic region are from ABI and from the FITS. Note that the size of bank lending to a
particular sector, industry, or geographical region in our data set is net of loans that are
already classified as either doubtful or non–performing.
The Financial Statement variables and capital structure details are obtained from the
Central Bank of Italy and Bankscope data bases. Stock market data items for the 34 banks
that are publicly traded were taken from the Datastream and Milan Stock exchange infor-
mation bases on Italian Banks. A few banks had to be discarded from the sample due to
missing values of relevant variables, e.g., doubtful and non–performing loans.
2.2 Construction of Herfindahl indices
We measure focus (diversification) by employing a Hirschman Herfindahl Index (HHI) mea-
sure. HHI is the sum of the squares of exposures as a fraction of total exposure under a
given classification. In our case, we construct three different kinds of HHI’s, which consist of
Industrial and Household sector HHI, simply referred to as Industrial sector HHI (I–HHI),
Broad Asset sector HHI (A–HHI), and Geographic HHI (G–HHI).
I–HHI is based on the 5 top industries where loans were made for each bank. The 6th
exposure considers the rest of the loans in these sectors. For the 6th exposure, we employed
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two conventions: first, where the 6th exposure is treated as a separate “hypothetical” in-
dustry, and second, where the 6th exposure is treated as being equally divided among the
remaining 18 industries. Our results were not sensitive to this choice. Hence, we report
results with I–HHI computed using the 6th exposure as a hypothetical industry. Thus, if the




2, where Q =
∑6
i=1Xi. Note that the HHI has a maximum of 1
when all loans are made to a single industry.
A–HHI is the sum of the squared exposures (measured as a fraction) in the form of
sovereign loans, other governmental loans, non-financial sector loans, financial sector loans,
household sector loans, and other loans.
G–HHI is the sum of the squared exposures (measured as a fraction) to Domestic (Italian)
loans, European Union loans, and Rest of the World loans.
2.3 Balance-sheet and Stock market variables
We employ the following (annual) variables obtained from the balance–sheet and stock mar-
ket data for the banks in our sample over the period 1993–1999.
Return measures:
1. ROA: return on assets measured as Net Income / Assets.
2. ROE: return on equity measured as Net Income / Equity.
3. SR: stock return measured as the return over the current year, i.e., as the return from
end of previous year to the last day of the current year.
4. BSR: market or beta–adjusted stock return measured as the residual from a one–factor
market model which employs MIB General, a weighted arithmetic average of all stocks
listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (Borsa Valori di Milano) as the market and where
the beta is computed for each year using the daily return series over the previous year.
Risk measure: DOUBT, the doubtful and non–performing assets ratio measured as Doubt-
ful and Non–performing Loans / Assets.
Control variables:
1. SIZE: asset size of the bank (in million).
8
2. EQRATIO: capital ratio of the bank measured as Equity (Book–Value) / Assets, the
equivalent of the bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio.
3. BRRATIO: branch ratio measured as Number of Bank Branches / Assets.
4. EMPRATIO: employee ratio measured as Number of Employees / Assets.
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE
Table 1 presents the univariate statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum,
and maximum) for these variables and for Herfindahl indices for all the banks over the sample
period of 1993–1999. Table 2 completes the descriptive statistics by presenting the correlation
matrix across these variables. As the tables illustrate, the three measures of focus, I–HHI,
A–HHI, and G–HHI, are not highly correlated suggesting the possibility that their effects on
bank efficiency may be different. Further, there is significant variation in all the variables
we employ and the correlations suggest a relationship between return measures (ROA, ROE,
and SR) and the balance-sheet control variables (SIZE, BRRATIO, EMPRATIO).
3 Effect of Focus on Bank Performance
To study the overall effect of a bank’s focus (diversification), we study its effect on both
bank return and bank risk. If focus produces an increase in bank return and a decrease in
bank risk, then we interpret this result as focus improving bank performance, and thus, by
implication that increased diversification would decrease bank performance. On the other
hand, if focus results in a decrease in bank return and an increase in bank risk, then we
conclude that focus reduces bank performance, i.e., increased diversification would improve
bank performance. When bank return and bank risk either both increase or both decrease,
the overall effect on bank performance is ambiguous and cannot be determined without
taking a stand on what constitutes an “efficient” risk–return tradeoff. We also conduct
several robustness checks including a simultaneous equations estimation of the return and
risk effects resulting from focus (diversification).
3.1 Test of hypothesis H.1: Effect of focus on bank returns
The hypothesis H.1 stated in the Introduction in terms of bank diversification is restated
below in terms of bank focus.
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H.1: The relationship between bank returns and focus is non–linear and U–shaped in bank
risk. To be precise, when loans have low exposure to sector downturns (downside risk), focus
has little impact for a bank’s returns; focus affects a bank’s returns most adversely when
loans have moderate downside risk; when loans have sufficiently high downside risk, focus
may actually enhance a bank’s returns.
We first consider the linear regression
Returnt = α0 + α1 ∗ I–HHIt + α2 ∗ A–HHIt + α3 ∗G–HHIt + t. (3.1)
The null hypothesis we want to test is that diversification is better for bank returns (“Don’t
put all your eggs in one basket”), i.e., by implication that focus is harmful to bank returns:
α1 < 0, α2 < 0, α3 < 0. (3.2)
As noted before, Returnt is proxied by four variables: (i) return on assets–ROA, (ii) return
on equity–ROE, (iii) stock return–SR, and (iv) market or beta–adjusted stock return–BSR.
The regressions are run by pooling all the observations across all banks and across all years.
In addition, we employ the following control variables for each bank: log of its size–SIZE,
its equity to assets ratio–EQRATIO, its branch to assets ratio–BRRATIO, its employment
expense to assets ratio–EMPRATIO, and the ratio of its doubtful and non–performing loans
to assets–DOUBT (the risk measure). Time-dummies are introduced for 1994 through 1999
to control for any temporal fixed effects. Similarly, bank fixed effects are introduced to
ensure that pooling of time–series observations for an individual bank with cross–sectional
observations across banks does not generate spurious statistical significance of estimated
coefficients.
The effect of focus (diversification) on bank returns may not be captured completely
through a contemporaneous relationship. If information about a bank’s decision to focus or
diversify is publicly available to the capital markets, then the share prices and hence stock
returns should adjust contemporaneously. However, this may be less true for adjustments in
book measures of bank return (return on assets–ROA, and, return on equity–ROE). Hence,
we also consider the specification in equation (3.1) above with one year lagged values of focus
measures: I–HHIt−1, A–HHIt−1, and G–HHIt−1.
Next, we test the hypothesis that, in contrast to the specification in equation (3.1),
the return–focus relationship is in fact non–linear and U–shaped in bank risk, as implied
by hypothesis H.1 above (see the discussion in the Introduction of the paper). Put an-
other way, the hypothesis states that bank risk interacts with bank focus in a U–shaped
manner in explaining the cross–sectional variation across banks in the return–focus relation-
ship. Mathematically, this is equivalent to the statement that the effect of focus on returns,
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d(Returns)/d(Focus), is U–shaped in risk, reaching its minimum at moderate levels of risk.
To try to capture this, we modify equation (3.1) by introducing interaction terms between
the focus measures and a measure of risk, the non–performing and doubtful loans (RISK)
as well as risk squared (RISK2). That is:
Returnt = α0 + α1 ∗ I–HHIt + α2 ∗ A–HHIt + α3 ∗G–HHIt + η ∗ Zt + β0 ∗ RISK +
β11 ∗ I–HHIt ∗ RISK + β12 ∗ I–HHIt ∗ RISK2 +
β21 ∗ A–HHIt ∗ RISK + β22 ∗ A–HHIt ∗ RISK2 +
β31 ∗G–HHIt ∗ RISK + β32 ∗G–HHIt ∗ RISK2 + t, (3.3)
where Zt is a vector representing the non–risk control variables stated above. Under this
specification, the effect of focus on returns is quadratic in risk. For example, for industrial
focus, I–HHI:
d(Return)/d(Focus) = α1 + β11 ∗ RISK + β12 ∗ RISK2. (3.4)
Thus, the hypothesis that the effect of a bank’s focus on its returns is U–shaped in its risk
takes the form:
β11 < 0, β12 > 0, β21 < 0, β22 > 0, β31 < 0, β32 > 0. (3.5)
As stated above, the measure of bank RISK employed in the regression above is the ratio
of doubtful and non–performing loans to assets, DOUBTt. For sake of robustness, we employ
two other measures of RISK: (i) AVGDOUBT, the average of each bank’s risk exposure, i.e.,
the average of DOUBTt for each bank over the entire time-period of our sample, 1993–
1999; and (ii) PREDOUBT, the predictable component of each bank’s risk computed from a
regression of DOUBTt on our measures of Focus (HHI’s). In other words, we treat DOUBTt
as an endogenous variable as specified in equation (3.6) and look at its predicted value.17
These latter measures are potentially more attractive as ex–ante measures of bank risk.18
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE.
17We also employed two additional measures: (i) PROVISIONS, the ratio of loan loss reserves for expected
losses reported by each bank in its balance–sheet to its assets, and (ii) (1 – EQRATIO), one minus the bank’s
(Tier–1) equity ratio EQRATIO, the latter being inversely related to bank risk. Both measures produced
qualitatively similar results with slightly weaker effects for the case of PROVISIONS as the risk measure.
For sake of expositional consistency with the rest of the paper, we state our results using risk measures that
are based on DOUBT, the doubtful and non–performing loans to assets ratio.
18Moreover, the ex–post measure is more likely to be correlated with current returns. This correlation
arises due to a simple accounting relationship: when realized losses are high, return is low.
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Table 3 presents the results for linear regressions of bank returns on focus specified in
equation (3.1) with return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), unadjusted stock re-
turn (SR), and market or beta–adjusted stock return (BSR) employed as alternative bank
return measures.19 The null hypothesis that focus reduces bank returns (and thus diversifi-
cation increases bank returns) is rejected for all three measures of lending focus: industrial
and household focus (I–HHI), broad asset sector focus (A–HHI), and geographic focus (G–
HHI), as reflected in the positive and statistically significant (mostly at 1% confidence level)
coefficients on these measures.20
INSERT TABLES 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D HERE.
We also tested the link between focus and bank returns employing a broader specification
which introduces the control variables, bank size (SIZE), bank capital ratio (EQRATIO),
branch to assets ratio (BRRATIO), employees to assets ratio (EMPRATIO), risk of bank
loans (DOUBT), and the year dummies for time fixed–effects, into the regression. The results
from this broader specification are contained in Table 4A. The inclusion of these variables
significantly enhances the explanatory power of equation (3.1). For brevity we only report
results for the return measures ROA and SR. The control variables for a bank’s capital ratio
and the risk of its loans (doubtful and non–performing loans to assets ratio) are strongly
significant in their effect on ROA but have a less significant impact on the bank’s stock
return (SR).
In Table 4B, we enhance the specification employed in Table 4A by adding bank–specific
fixed effects. The motivation for introducing bank–specific fixed effects stems from a con-
cern that if there is not adequate time–series variation in the balance–sheet and return
observations for a bank, then pooling its time–series observations may spuriously increase
the statistical significance of estimated coefficients. Results in Table 4B illustrate however
that this does not affect our results. As before (Table 4A), all the focus measures (I–HHI, A–
HHI, and G–HHI) have a positive and statistically significant effect on bank return measures,
even after allowing for bank–specific fixed effects.
In Table 4C, we replace the focus measures (HHIt) by their one–year lags (HHIt−1). The
results are very similar to the specification with contemporaneous focus measures. In Table
4D, we consider the specification which employs the contemporaneous focus measures, HHIt,
and the increase in focus measures, HHIt - HHIt−1. In the presence of contemporaneous
19Note that all standard errors reported in the tables are corrected using White’s adjustment for het-
eroscedasticity. Examination of lags (VIF statistic in SAS program for multiple regression) did not reveal a
significant auto–correlation problem in our data.
20Note that the sample size is much smaller for the stock return based measures of bank returns since only
34 out of our 105 banks are publicly traded.
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focus, the increase in focus (HHIt - HHIt−1) appears to have little additional explanatory
power.
INSERT TABLES 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D HERE.
Tables 5A–5D test whether the return–focus relationship is non–linear and U–shaped in
bank risk, thus linking the cross–sectional effect of focus on returns to the level of bank
risk (see equation 3.3). Table 5A employs the doubtful and non–performing loans to assets
ratio (DOUBTt) as the measure of bank risk (RISK). Table 5B allows for bank–specific fixed
effects in the specification of equation 3.3. Table 5C employs the average of the realized
doubtful and non–performing loans to assets ratio for each bank over the entire sample
period 1993–1999 (AVGDOUBT) as the measure of bank risk. Finally, Table 5D employs
the predicted value of DOUBT obtained through a regression of DOUBT on focus variables
(equation 3.6 below) as the measure of bank risk (PREDOUBTt).
As can be seen, Tables 5A, 5C, and 5D provide support for the U–shape hypothesis
describing the relationship between focus and returns conditional on the risk level of the
bank. The coefficients on the interaction terms, HHIt∗RISK, and HHIt∗RISK2, are negative
and positive, respectively, and statistically significant. This holds for both measures of bank
returns, ROA and SR, for all three measures of focus, I–HHI, A–HHI, and G–HHI, and
for all three versions of bank risk, DOUBT, AVGDOUBT, and PREDOUBT.21 Table 5B
confirms that the significance of these coefficients is not affected by the introduction of bank–
specific fixed effects. The U–shape hypothesis continues to hold though the coefficients on
the quadratic interaction terms are less significant statistically than under Table 5A.
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 6 HERE.
To understand the economic significance of this U–shape relationship, Figure 2 plots the
marginal effect d(ROA)/d(Focus) for different values of DOUBT for all three measures of
Focus, I–HHI, A–HHI, and G–HHI, based on Table 5A, Column 2 (for ROA) coefficients.
The range of DOUBT is taken to be between 0% and 50% which covers the minimum (zero)
and the maximum value (45%) over our sample period. Table 6 presents the minimum, 10
percentile, 25 percentile, 50 percentile, 75 percentile, 90 percentile, and the maximum values
for DOUBT (ranked across all banks) for each of the years, 1993 through 1999. Note that
mean (median) doubtful and non–performing loans to assets ratio over the entire sample
period is 5% (3%) with a standard deviation of 5.6%.
21The results are somewhat weaker for stock return as the measure of bank returns compared to ROA.
Also, in Table 5D, when PREDOUBT is employed as the measure of risk, the coefficients on the linear
interaction terms are statistically insignificant for I–HHI and A–HHI though all coefficients have the correct
signs.
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As can be seen from Figure 2, for the mean (median) bank in our sample, the effect of a
small increase in industrial focus on returns (I–HHI) is very small and positive. Importantly,
the effect of a small increase in industrial focus is uniformly positive for the entire range of
DOUBT values. This positive effect rises sharply as bank risk increases above a DOUBT
value of about 10%. In other words, for most banks in our sample (banks with moderate
levels of risk), industrial focus has a relatively small positive effect on bank returns. However,
for the few banks in our sample with very high levels of risk, industrial focus has a large
positive effect on bank returns.
On the other hand, a small increase in asset sectoral focus (A–HHI) and geographic focus
(G–HHI) has a small and negative effect on returns for the mean (median) bank. Specifically,
the effect of a small increase in asset sector focus is negligible for bank returns for a DOUBT
level up to 15% (which represents about the 85th percentile in the bank sample) and is
positive and increasing sharply for banks with DOUBT greater than 15%. In fact, the
positive effect of focus on returns at high risk levels is stronger for broad asset sector focus
than for industrial focus. However, a small increase in geographic focus has a negative effect
on returns for most banks in our sample, reaching its minimum between DOUBT values
of 15–25% and becoming positive only at extremely high levels of risk (DOUBT values
greater than 37.5%). Alternatively, diversification across sectors and geographical regions is
beneficial for the returns of moderate risk banks, but is costly for very high risk banks.
This lends empirical support to Winton (1999)’s hypothesis that diversification (focus)
has a “slight” benefit (cost) at low bank risk levels, has maximum benefit (cost) at moderate
risk levels, and in fact, hurts (helps) bank returns at very high risk levels. Indeed, we find
that for industrial focus, there is only a cost (and no benefit) associated with diversification
for banks in our sample. It is important to note however that examining bank returns is
only one side of the tradeoff between return and risk. We examine next the other side of the
tradeoff: the effect of the decision to focus (diversify) on bank loan risk.
3.2 Test of hypothesis H.2: Effect of focus on bank loan risk
The hypothesis H.2 stated in the Introduction in terms of bank diversification is restated
below in terms of bank focus.
H.2: A bank’s monitoring effectiveness may be lower in newly entered and more competitive
sectors, and thus, being focused can result in a superior quality of loans and reduce the bank’s
risk of failure.
In order to study the effect of focus (diversification) on bank monitoring incentives, and
in turn, on the quality of bank loans, we consider first the risk of bank loans as a dependent
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variable in the regression
RISKt = γ0 + γ1 ∗ I–HHIt + γ2 ∗ A–HHIt + γ3 ∗G–HHIt + η ∗ Zt + θ ∗ RISKt−1 + t,
(3.6)
where, as before, Zt are the non–risk control variables, and risk is proxied by the variable
DOUBTt. Then, the simplest version of hypothesis H.2 (discussed in the Introduction) is
the null hypothesis that an increase in focus (increase in HHI) reduces the risk of bank loans.
γ1 < 0, γ2 < 0, γ3 < 0. (3.7)
Moreover, entering into “new” loan sectors may adversely affect the bank loan quality
due to lack of monitoring specialization and/or due to poor monitoring incentives.22 To
test this aspect of hypothesis H.2, we introduce the first difference in bank focus measures
as a variable to track an inter–temporal increase in bank focus (i.e., a decrease in bank
diversification):
RISKt = γ0 + γ1 ∗ I–HHIt + γ2 ∗ A–HHIt + γ3 ∗G–HHIt + η ∗ Zt + θ ∗ RISKt−1 +
δ1 ∗ (I–HHIt − I–HHIt−1) + δ2 ∗ (A–HHIt − A–HHIt−1) +
δ3 ∗ (G–HHIt −G–HHIt−1) + t. (3.8)
An inter–temporal increase in focus (a decrease in diversification), i.e., HHIt− HHIt−1 > 0,
should reduce bank risk:
δ1 < 0, δ2 < 0, δ3 < 0. (3.9)
We also introduce an additional variable, COMP, that measures the extent of competition
a bank faces in its top five industries (by exposure amounts) in the non–financial and house-
hold part of the portfolio. Formally, COMP for bank i is measured as
∑5
j=1[ 1− (Xij/Rj) ],
where R =
∑N
j=1Xij, the total exposure across all banks (1 through N) to industry j. Note
that COMP is higher for bank i if its exposure to the (top 5) industries it lends to is smaller
compared to the exposure of the other banks to the same set of industries, i.e., it is a smaller
player in lending to these industries, and thus, likely to face greater competition and adverse
selection when it expands into these industries.
To test a potential “winner’s curse” effect, we consider a modification of regression (3.8)
by introducing an interaction term between the measure of competition faced by the bank
22As noted before, we use the term “new” for industries in the sense that previous exposures of the bank
to these industries had been lower or non–existent.
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and the change in its industrial focus (I–HHIt - I–HHIt−1):
RISKt = γ0 + γ1 ∗ I–HHIt + γ2 ∗ A–HHIt + γ3 ∗G–HHIt + η ∗ Zt + θ ∗ RISKt−1 +
δ11 ∗ (I–HHIt − I–HHIt−1) + δ12 ∗ (I–HHIt − I–HHIt−1) ∗ COMPt +
δ2 ∗ (A–HHIt − A–HHIt−1) + δ3 ∗ (G–HHIt −G–HHIt−1) + t. (3.10)
The null hypothesis is that d(RISK)/d(Increase in Focus) is decreasing in the extent of
competition, i.e., the interaction term above has a negative coefficient.23
δ12 < 0. (3.11)
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE.
Table 7 presents the empirical evidence on how the decision to focus or diversify affects
endogenously the risk of bank loans by reporting the results for the tests specified in equa-
tions (3.6) through (3.11) above. The risk of bank loans is proxied by the doubtful and
non–performing loans to assets ratio (DOUBTt). The first column of Table 7 tests the hy-
pothesis based on the preliminary specification in equation (3.6), the second column tests the
hypothesis based on the specification in equation (3.8) where we employ the first difference
in focus measures (HHIt - HHIt−1) as explanatory variables, and the third column tests the
hypothesis based on the specification in equation (3.10) where we also employ the interaction
term between the change in industrial focus and the extent of competition in the lending
sector faced by the bank [(I–HHIt - I–HHIt−1) * COMPt].
An interesting pattern emerges from Table 7. From Column 1, we see that industrial and
asset sector focus (I–HHI and A–HHI) reduces the risk of bank loans as indicated by the
negative and statistically significant (at 5% confidence level) coefficients on these measures of
focus. However, geographical focus (G–HHI) increases the risk of bank loans. This suggests
that diseconomies in bank monitoring arise more from expansion across industries and asset
sectors rather than from geographical expansion. This difference is further confirmed in
Column 2 where we employ the first difference in focus measures as explanatory variables.
When a bank increases focus over time by lending more to fewer industries or asset sectors (I–
HHIt > I–HHIt−1, A–HHIt > A–HHIt−1), there is a decrease in the risk of it loans. However,
an increase in geographical focus (G–HHIt > G–HHIt−1) seems to have little effect on loan
risk.
23Note that if diversification has an effect on bank risk due to (agency) costs associated with any corre-
sponding increase in the bank size, increase in the number of branches or employees, then such effects should
get at least partially captured through the coefficients in the regressions on the control variables: SIZE,
BRRATIO, and EMPRATIO.
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Finally, Column 3 reveals that when a bank diversifies by entering into new industrial
sectors, loan risk increases at a rate that is increasing in the extent of competition that the
bank faces in the (five largest) industries it has a loan exposure to. The coefficient on the
interaction term [(I–HHIt - I–HHIt−1) * COMPt] is negative and significant suggesting that an
increase in focus, i.e., a decrease in diversification, reduces risk more when the competition
that the bank faces in its loan sectors is smaller. This provides evidence supporting the
“winner’s curse” hypothesis that banks face greater adverse selection when they expand into
industries that have been previously penetrated by their competitors. This also suggests
that if banks take this effect of competition into account and are value–maximizing, then
they should choose to diversify (if at all) in industries with a lower penetration by other
banks, as proposed by Boot and Thakor (2000). This would mitigate the adverse effect of
industrial or sectoral diversification on their loan quality.
3.3 Simultaneous estimation of return and risk regressions
As a robustness check to these results, we consider the effect of focus on bank returns
(ROA, SR) and bank risk (DOUBT), where both return and risk are treated as endogenous
variables simultaneously estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique
(see Johnson, 1972, Maddala, 1977, and Theil, 1971):
Returnt = α0 + α1 ∗ I–HHIt + α2 ∗ A–HHIt + α3 ∗G–HHIt +
ηp ∗ Zt + θp ∗ RISKt−1 + ωp ∗ Returnt−1 +
β11 ∗ (I–HHIt − I–HHIt−1) + β12 ∗ (I–HHIt − I–HHIt−1) ∗ COMPt +
β2 ∗ (A–HHIt − A–HHIt−1) + β3 ∗ (G–HHIt −G–HHIt−1) + pt,
(3.12)
RISKt = γ0 + γ1 ∗ I–HHIt + γ2 ∗ A–HHIt + γ3 ∗G–HHIt +
ηr ∗ Zt + θr ∗ RISKt−1 + ωr ∗ Returnt−1 +
δ11 ∗ (I–HHIt − I–HHIt−1) + +δ12 ∗ (I–HHIt − I–HHIt−1) ∗ COMPt +
δ2 ∗ (A–HHIt − A–HHIt−1) + δ3 ∗ (G–HHIt −G–HHIt−1) + rt.
(3.13)
Note that under SUR estimation, the residuals pt and rt are allowed to be heteroscedastic
and correlated. The possibility of a correlation between the two residuals implies that the
two regressions may be “related.” The t–statistics from the estimation of the SUR system
above are thus corrected for heteroscedasticity as well as for correlation of residuals.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE.
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The simultaneous estimation results in Table 8 provides a robustness check for our results
on the effect of focus on bank returns (Tables 3, 4) and on the effect of focus on bank risk
(Table 7). Consistent with results in Tables 3 and 4, the overall effect of all three focus
measures is to improve bank returns on average as implied by the positive and statistically
significant coefficients on I–HHI, A–HHI, and G–HHI, for both ROA and SR. Similarly,
industrial and sectoral focus reduces bank risk, whereas geographic focus increases bank
risk, as in Table 7.
3.4 Overall effect of focus on bank performance
Combining the empirical findings of Tables 3 through Table 8 on the effect of diversification
on bank returns (hypothesis H.1) and bank loan risk (hypothesis H.2), we summarize our
results in Figure 3.
We conclude that for our sample of Italian banks:
1. Industrial diversification results in an inefficient tradeoff between risk and return for
all banks: return declines with diversification, and simultaneously, loan risk increases.
This implies an overall deterioration in bank performance.
2. Broad asset sectoral diversification results in an inefficient tradeoff between risk and
return for banks with very high risk levels: for these banks, return declines with di-
versification, and simultaneously, loan risk increases. Again, this implies an overall
deterioration in bank performance.
3. Geographic diversification results in an improvement in the tradeoff between risk and
return for banks with moderate risk levels: for these banks, return improves with
diversification and so does loan risk. This implies an overall improvement in bank
performance.
4. The effect of asset sectoral diversification on banks with moderate risk levels, and
the effect of geographical diversification on banks with very high risk levels cannot be
assessed without taking a stand on how much should bank return increase per unit
increase in bank risk.
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Figure 3: Summary of the Effect of Diversification on Bank Return, Risk, and
Performance
Moderately Risky Banks Highly Risky Banks
Return ↓ Return ↓
Industrial Risk ↑ Risk ↑
Diversification ⇒ Decreased Performance ⇒ Decreased Performance
Return ↑ Return ↓
Sectoral Risk ↑ Risk ↑
Diversification Effect on Performance Ambiguous ⇒ Decreased Performance
Return ↑ Return ↓
Geographic Risk ↓ Risk ↓
Diversification ⇒ Improved Performance Effect on Performance Ambiguous
Crucially, Figure 3 implies that the “conventional wisdom” of not putting all eggs in one
basket cannot be applied uniformly across all banks. Our results also point out a potentially
important economic difference between diversification that is achieved through industrial or
asset sectoral exposures and diversification that is achieved through geographical expansion.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effect of a bank’s decision to focus (diversify) on its return and
risk. Understanding these two effects enable us to derive conclusions on the overall effects
of focus or diversification on a bank’s performance. Indeed, we believe that this is the first
paper to compute and employ measures of focus (diversification) based on industrial and
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sectoral exposures in individual bank asset portfolios. Our tests are based on a unique data
set of 105 Italian banks over the sample period 1993–1999.
Our results have implications for the optimal size and scope of a “bank”. While tradi-
tional banking theory based on a delegated monitor argument (see, for example, Boyd and
Prescott, 1986) recommends that the optimal organization of a bank is one where it is fully
diversified, our results suggest that empirically, there seem to be diseconomies of diversifica-
tion for certain banks. These diseconomies arise in the form of poor monitoring incentives
and/or greater credit risk of loan portfolios when a bank expands into too many industries or
asset sectors given its monitoring capabilities. This finding complements the agency theory
based analysis of the boundaries of a bank’s activities as proposed in Cerasi and Daltung
(2000) among others, and also suggests that the optimal industrial organization of a bank-
ing sector might be one that comprises several focused banks instead of a large number of
diversified banks, an outcome that may also be attractive from a systemic risk standpoint
as noted by Acharya (2001) and Shafffer (1994).
From a normative standpoint, our results suggest a cautious warning flag to regulators
regarding the adoption of regulatory mechanisms that encourage complete bank–level diver-
sification. A similar caveat applies to the attempts to measure credit portfolio risk through
traditional diversification measures without bank–specific risk–return measurements. Our
results also help explain the results of DeLong (2001) who finds that bank mergers that
are focusing (in terms of geography and activity) produce superior economic performance
relative to those that are diversifying.
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